Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: a revisitation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.02.028zbMath1398.91092OpenAlexW2599521091MaRDI QIDQ1673521

Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho, Alphonse Fodouop Fotso

Publication date: 12 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.028

zbMATH Keywords

regretsequential gamesconservative criterionirrational optimismmyopic/farsighted rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: a revisitation ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise

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• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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