On the efficiency of the first price auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.05.003zbMath1396.91252OpenAlexW2614484174MaRDI QIDQ1673553

Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Fabio Michelucci

Publication date: 12 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/25347/1/25347.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyEnglish auctionfirst price auctionprivatizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Inefficient rushes in auctions

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