General theorem on a finite support of mixed strategy in the theory of zero-sum games

DOI10.1134/S1064562418030055zbMath1397.91016OpenAlexW2884033627WikidataQ129522086 ScholiaQ129522086MaRDI QIDQ1673693

Sergey N. Smirnov

Publication date: 13 September 2018

Published in: Doklady Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064562418030055

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamesmixed strategyfinite support

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cites Work

• On general minimax theorems
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 2
• Minimax Theorems
• Probability Theory
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