Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff

DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2016.12.008zbMath1375.91028OpenAlexW2565745880MaRDI QIDQ1674286

Tetsushi Ohdaira

Publication date: 2 November 2017

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2016.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmulti-agent systemsevolutionary computationsspatial prisoner's dilemma gamepeer-punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity ⋮ Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks ⋮ Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable ⋮ THE DIVERSITY IN THE DECISION FACILITATES COOPERATION IN THE SEQUENTIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

Cites Work

• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
• Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks

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