Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2013-0072zbMath1375.91193OpenAlexW2166634590MaRDI QIDQ1674999

Ester Camiña, Francisco Alvarez

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=2687414

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardefficiency-inducing policiesemission permits market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Stochastic pollution, permits, and merger incentives
• Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking.
• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

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