Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
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Publication:1675000
DOI10.1515/bejte-2013-0022zbMath1375.91128OpenAlexW1975495778MaRDI QIDQ1675000
Giuseppe De Marco, Giovanni Immordino
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0022
Related Items (5)
Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model ⋮ Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model ⋮ Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity ⋮ Team production and esteem: a dual selves model with belief-dependent preferences
Cites Work
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- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- Fairness and desert in tournaments
- Dynamic psychological games
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- Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
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- Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
- Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility
- Promises and Partnership
- On Minimizing Nonseparable Functions Defined on the Integers with an Inventory Application
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