On run-preventing contract design

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0007zbMath1375.91250OpenAlexW757007645MaRDI QIDQ1675005

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-1/bejte-2014-0007/bejte-2014-0007.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

implementationstrategy-proofmechanism designbank runsdeposit contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents

Cites Work

• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

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