Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk

DOI10.1515/bejte-2014-0017zbMath1375.91038OpenAlexW2266097679MaRDI QIDQ1675010

Peng Zhang

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-2/bejte-2014-0017/bejte-2014-0017.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinformationcheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control ⋮ Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures

Cites Work

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• Dynamic learning and strategic communication
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Informational control and organizational design
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Long Cheap Talk

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