Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
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Publication:1675010
DOI10.1515/bejte-2014-0017zbMath1375.91038OpenAlexW2266097679MaRDI QIDQ1675010
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-2/bejte-2014-0017/bejte-2014-0017.xml?format=INT
Related Items (6)
Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control ⋮ Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures
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- Strategic Information Transmission
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- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Long Cheap Talk
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