Managerial collusive behavior under asymmetric incentive schemes

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0079zbMath1375.91131OpenAlexW2240933791MaRDI QIDQ1675018

Patrick de Lamirande, Jean-Daniel Guigou

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-2/bejte-2014-0079/bejte-2014-0079.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetrycollusionbalanced temptation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Managerial delegation and welfare effects of cost reductions
• Welfare properties of strategic R\&D investments in Hotelling models
• Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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