Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0066zbMath1375.91189OpenAlexW3125755145MaRDI QIDQ1675022

Christian Ewerhart

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0066

zbMATH Keywords

shooting methodHotelling gamemixed-strategy equilibriumstrategic forecasting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (1)

Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution

Cites Work

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• Integral bases for the universal enveloping algebras of map algebras
• Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
• Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 1
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• An Optimization Problem with a Surprisingly Simple Solution
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

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