On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory

DOI10.1515/bejte-2015-0074zbMath1375.91075OpenAlexW2185904368MaRDI QIDQ1675023

Konrad Grabiszewski

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-2/bejte-2015-0074/bejte-2015-0074.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

state spaceSEU theorySEU-rationalization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (2)

Constructive decision theory ⋮ Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Cites Work

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