Price reveal auctions

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0099zbMath1375.91094OpenAlexW77048344MaRDI QIDQ1675027

Andrea Gallice

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0099

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous price decreasepay-per-bid auctionsprice reveal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Price reveal auctions

Cites Work

• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• Price reveal auctions
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• Remarks on nodal volume statistics for regular and chaotic wave functions in various dimensions
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• Optimal Auction Design
• The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions

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