Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0098zbMath1375.91200OpenAlexW2427094983MaRDI QIDQ1675029

Bianca Rundshagen, Alfred Endres

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-2/bejte-2014-0098/bejte-2014-0098.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

infinite time horizonrepeat offenderscrime prevention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history ⋮ The option value of record-based sanctions

Cites Work

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• Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law
• The chain store paradox
• Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
• Self-organizing production and exchange
• Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance

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