Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0055zbMath1375.91010OpenAlexW2430882527MaRDI QIDQ1675033

Zeynel Harun Alioğulları, Mehmet Barlo

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-2/bejte-2015-0055/bejte-2015-0055.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

complexityanticipationproperperfectpersistentrefinements of Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

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• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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