Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0106zbMath1375.91096OpenAlexW1509914498MaRDI QIDQ1675035

Seungjin Han

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2014-05.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

clickstreamrobust equilibriumcompeting mechanismimplicit collusiononline markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples

Cites Work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Robust competitive auctions
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions

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