On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
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Publication:1675038
DOI10.1515/bejte-2015-0091zbMath1375.91070OpenAlexW2425896525MaRDI QIDQ1675038
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0091
Related Items (2)
Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power
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