Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0093zbMath1375.91020OpenAlexW2407160449MaRDI QIDQ1675040

Selçuk Özyurt

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0093

zbMATH Keywords

reputationdispute resolutioncontinuous-time gameswar of attrition game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• The war of attrition with incomplete information
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets
• Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers
• On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties

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