Profit tax evasion under wage bargaining structure

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0090zbMath1375.91184OpenAlexW2407087128MaRDI QIDQ1675042

T. C. Michael Wu

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-2/bejte-2014-0090/bejte-2014-0090.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

wage bargainingseparabilityprofit tax evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, paternalism and optimal mixed taxation
• Privatization and efficiency wages
• Learning-by-doing in torts: liability and information about accident technology
• Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?
• A note on franchising and wage bargaining
• The Bargaining Problem
• GROWTH AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
• Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations
• Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax
• THE WELFARE GAINS OF AGE‐RELATED OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION
• Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence

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