The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90186-9zbMath1375.91101OpenAlexW2080493458MaRDI QIDQ1676608

Richard W. Stolz, Paul A. Spindt

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90186-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

Cites Work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
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