A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90020-7zbMath1375.91071OpenAlexW2016744495WikidataQ127814272 ScholiaQ127814272MaRDI QIDQ1676634

Peter Fristrup, Hans Keiding

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90020-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

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Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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