Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-ZzbMath1375.91095OpenAlexW2019005365MaRDI QIDQ1676648

Robert C. Marshall, Jean-Francois Richard, Daniel A. Graham

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism ⋮ Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values ⋮ A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis ⋮ Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders ⋮ Shills and snipes ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design