A partial characterization of a history-dependent, subgame-perfect equilibrium: the case of an exhaustible resource duopoly

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90053-4zbMath1375.91155OpenAlexW1569997767WikidataQ126656668 ScholiaQ126656668MaRDI QIDQ1676656

Robert D. Cairns, Michel Moreaux

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90053-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information

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