On the possibility of price wars when firms use a `tit-for-tat' strategy

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90062-6zbMath1375.91113OpenAlexW1999787867MaRDI QIDQ1676662

Paul W. Dobson, C. Donald Sinclair

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90062-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Research on price wars in supply chain networks based on multistage evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Unnamed Item

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