The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90022-SzbMath1375.91008OpenAlexW1586584125MaRDI QIDQ1676696

Manfred J. Holler

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90022-s

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Inspection games with long-run inspectors ⋮ Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game. Theory and experimental evidence

Cites Work

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• Reputation and imperfect information
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations

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