Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9zbMath1375.91097OpenAlexW1981431602MaRDI QIDQ1676708

John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition