On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90018-VzbMath1375.91175MaRDI QIDQ1676748

Sugata Marjit

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (21)

General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation ⋮ Licensing under general demand and cost functions ⋮ Privatization in the presence of patent licensing ⋮ Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit? ⋮ Profit-sharing licensing ⋮ Technology licensing and collusion ⋮ Impact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopoly ⋮ More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies ⋮ Information disclosure through technology licensing ⋮ Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival ⋮ Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing ⋮ Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look ⋮ Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry ⋮ Technology licensing under optimal tax policy ⋮ Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model ⋮ Technology licensing under product differentiation ⋮ Technology transfer: barriers and opportunities ⋮ On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations ⋮ Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies ⋮ Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information ⋮ Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models

Cites Work

• Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry

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