Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0552-8zbMath1415.91186OpenAlexW429263689WikidataQ59613981 ScholiaQ59613981MaRDI QIDQ1677245

Sergiu C. Ungureanu

Publication date: 10 November 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0552-8

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmechanism designinformation structuredynamic contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Learning about variable demand in the long run
• Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
• Sequential Screening
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

This page was built for publication: Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information