The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
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Publication:1677247
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0554-6zbMath1415.91021OpenAlexW2530088584MaRDI QIDQ1677247
Publication date: 10 November 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0554-6
Related Items (11)
Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core ⋮ Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem ⋮ Consistency and the core in games with externalities ⋮ Games in sequencing situations with externalities ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form ⋮ Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach
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