Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0564-4zbMath1415.91211OpenAlexW2528406312MaRDI QIDQ1677256

Azar Abizada

Publication date: 10 November 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0564-4

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintpairwise stabilitypath to stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Graduate admission with financial support

Cites Work

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