Venture investment incentive mechanisms and simulation with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts based on fairness preference theory

DOI10.1155/2016/5862576zbMath1410.91252OpenAlexW2531180481WikidataQ59123587 ScholiaQ59123587MaRDI QIDQ1677728

Chuan Ding, Jiacheng Chen, Ai-min Li, Kai-Hong Wang

Publication date: 13 November 2017

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/5862576

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent relationshipfairness preference theoryventure entrepreneursventure investment incentive mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity

Cites Work

• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
• Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Unnamed Item

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