Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands

DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9435-yzbMath1380.91030OpenAlexW2178195639MaRDI QIDQ1678765

Ameya Hate, Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar

Publication date: 7 November 2017

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9435-y

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumelastic demandprice of stabilitynetwork pricingselfish routing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements
• Trading networks with price-setting agents
• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• A network pricing game for selfish traffic
• A contract-based model for directed network formation
• Frugal path mechanisms
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Interdomain Routing and Games
• Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities
• Bertrand Competition in Networks

This page was built for publication: Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands