On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005zbMath1415.91180OpenAlexW2564676145MaRDI QIDQ1680097

Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver, Onur Kesten

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

probabilistic serial mechanismenvy-freenessassigning indivisible objectsincentive and invariance properties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization ⋮ The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain ⋮ A characterization of the extended serial correspondence ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences

Cites Work

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• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• House allocation with fractional endowments
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• On cores and indivisibility
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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