Divide and compromise
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Publication:1680104
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.04.004zbMath1415.91184OpenAlexW2739730964MaRDI QIDQ1680104
Rodrigo A. Velez, Antonio Nicolò
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/divide-and-compromise(07142dd7-fc6b-4426-93b3-a5b7f773f386).html
Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (4)
Sharing an increase of the rent fairly ⋮ A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget ⋮ An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget
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