Divide and compromise

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.04.004zbMath1415.91184OpenAlexW2739730964MaRDI QIDQ1680104

Rodrigo A. Velez, Antonio Nicolò

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/divide-and-compromise(07142dd7-fc6b-4426-93b3-a5b7f773f386).html

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriaallocation of indivisible gooddivide-and-choose mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Sharing an increase of the rent fairly ⋮ A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget ⋮ An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget

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