Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
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Publication:1680109
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.002zbMath1415.91119OpenAlexW3121969222MaRDI QIDQ1680109
Bernardo Moreno, Dolors Berga, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/893.pdf
immunitygroup strategy-proofnessnon-manipulabilitycredible deviations from truthpublic good decision
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
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- Voting by Committees
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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