A lemma in open sequential voting by veto

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.003zbMath1415.91115OpenAlexW2736432792WikidataQ125056461 ScholiaQ125056461MaRDI QIDQ1680112

Natalia M. Novikova, Irina I. Pospelova

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical gamesrational choicesequential voting by vetointuitive rationalityorder of votingsophisticated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Voting theory (91B12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players ⋮ Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. I: Conditions for making the given decision
• Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile
• Vetoing in social choice with blockings
• Sophisticated voting under the sequential Voting by Veto

This page was built for publication: A lemma in open sequential voting by veto