Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.006zbMath1415.91111OpenAlexW2518896667MaRDI QIDQ1680113

M. Utku Ünver, Hervé Crès

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

symmetric distributionvoters\(50\%\)-majority equilibriumSimpson-Kramer scoresspatial voting model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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