Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
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Publication:1680145
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.005zbMath1415.91034OpenAlexW2763307367MaRDI QIDQ1680145
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.005
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