Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
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Publication:1680146
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.09.002zbMath1415.91077OpenAlexW2759989318MaRDI QIDQ1680146
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.002
Stackelberg equilibriumexistence of equilibriumsupermodular gamessetup costsentry deterrencenon quasiconcave payoff
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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