Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.001zbMath1415.91177OpenAlexW2595079790MaRDI QIDQ1680147

Battal Doğan

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumimplementationresponsible agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Evaluation and strategic manipulation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

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