Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.003zbMath1415.91117OpenAlexW3124297748MaRDI QIDQ1680148

Martin Van der Linden

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessmechanism designvetoprobabilistic mechanismcommittee selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players

Cites Work

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• Voting by committees under constraints
• A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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