Proving resistance against invariant attacks: how to choose the round constants
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Publication:1680234
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-63715-0_22zbMath1410.94045OpenAlexW2728494734MaRDI QIDQ1680234
Anne Canteaut, Gregor Leander, Christof Beierle, Yann Rotella
Publication date: 15 November 2017
Full work available at URL: https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01631130/document
block cipherprincenonlinear invariantinvariant subspace attackskinnyLEDlinear layermantismidoriround constants
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