Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.05.008zbMath1415.91128OpenAlexW3124365371MaRDI QIDQ1680737

Myrna Holtz Wooders, Anne van den Nouweland

Publication date: 16 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

share equilibriumpublic good economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• Share equilibrium in local public good economies
• Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
• The epsilon core of a large replica game
• Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
• Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Strongly stable networks
• The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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