Profiting from product-harm crises in competitive markets
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Publication:1681343
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.032zbMath1374.90268OpenAlexW2736883748MaRDI QIDQ1681343
Publication date: 23 November 2017
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.032
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
Related Items (6)
Price and quality competition while envisioning a quality-related product recall ⋮ Managing quality and pricing during a product recall: an analysis of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis regimes ⋮ A survey of dynamic models of product quality ⋮ Product Recalls and Channel Pricing ⋮ Advertising and quality improving strategies in a supply chain when facing potential crises ⋮ The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic
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- The Machine Maintenance and Sale Age Model of Kamien and Schwartz Revisited
- Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
- Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry
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