Evaluating the strategic behavior of cement producers: an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.06.043zbMath1375.90325OpenAlexW2689268109MaRDI QIDQ1681534

Carlos Ruiz, Giorgia Oggioni, Rossana Riccardi, Elisabetta Allevi, Antonio J. Conejo

Publication date: 23 November 2017

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.06.043

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingmixed-integer linear programming (MILP)cement industryEquilibrium problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Mixed integer programming (90C11) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

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Cites Work

• National-strategic investment in European power transmission capacity
• Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities
• Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games
• The steel industry: a mathematical model under environmental regulations
• Solving multi-leader–common-follower games
• A Representation and Economic Interpretation of a Two-Level Programming Problem
• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems

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