Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.physleta.2017.09.041zbMath1376.91032OpenAlexW2763378300MaRDI QIDQ1681573

Bin Wu, Xiukai Sui, Long Wang

Publication date: 24 November 2017

Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2017.09.041

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic evolutionary dynamicssecond-order cooperative dilemmatolerant punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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