Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.007zbMath1414.91067OpenAlexW2755613326MaRDI QIDQ1682711

Jason R. Marden

Publication date: 5 December 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

game theorylearningnetworked control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

A strategic learning algorithm for state-based games ⋮ Learning to play efficient coarse correlated equilibria

Cites Work

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• Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Learning by trial and error
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Value of information in two-team zero-sum problems
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning
• Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games

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