Limited rationality and the strategic environment: further theory and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.014zbMath1414.91065OpenAlexW2762928260MaRDI QIDQ1682722

Henry S. Schneider, Michael Waldman, Kristen B. Cooper

Publication date: 5 December 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.014

zbMATH Keywords

experimentconvergence to equilibriumtheorybeauty contestlimited rationalitystrategic complements and substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Individual expectations, limited rationality and aggregate outcomes
• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• Partners and strangers revisited
• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• Competing against experienced and inexperienced players
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• How do experienced traders respond to inflows of inexperienced traders? An experimental analysis
• Price stability and volatility in markets with positive and negative expectations feedback: an experimental investigation
• Guessing with negative feedback: an experiment
• The two-person beauty contest
• Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes
• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

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