Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value

DOI10.1007/s00186-017-0595-zzbMath1411.91049OpenAlexW2652372671MaRDI QIDQ1683939

Hui Zhang, Panfei Sun, Dongshuang Hou, Hao Sun

Publication date: 1 December 2017

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-017-0595-z

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameaxiomatizationallocation processED valueENSC value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river

Cites Work

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• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
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• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Matrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory
• Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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