Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0562-6zbMath1411.91419OpenAlexW3124030826MaRDI QIDQ1684126

Battal Doğan, Wonki Jo Cho

Publication date: 8 December 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0562-6

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityschool choiceimmediate acceptance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities

Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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