Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
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Publication:1684127
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0568-8zbMath1411.91373OpenAlexW2520198787MaRDI QIDQ1684127
Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara
Publication date: 8 December 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.umass.edu/economics/publications/2017-05.pdf
Nash equilibriumboundary problemexchange economiesintrinsic preferences for responsibilityprice-quantity mechanism
Related Items
Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
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